Even today theoretical endeavors in sociology seem to be informed by some idea of a networking going on between different elements of social action framing and thereby sustaining each other. Indeed, to talk of anything "social" always means to look at a combination of restriction and support as the characteristic features of relations. Jon Elster of late conceives of a general theory of constraints produced by the actors as a commitment and a sort of stake, which is negotiable among them. Stephan Fuchs is interested in networks that allow for variation. And Andrew Abbott looks at self-similar structures of the social that are defined by fractal distinctions which both single out certain features and use them to delimit their connection to other structures. Similar attempts abound.

What we propose here is to combine the ideas of network and of self-reference. Network synthesis means that any element of the network, referring to other elements of the same network, at some point will end up referring to itself, thereby discovering, and exploiting, the circularity, which means heterarchy (Gotthard Günther), of the network. Note in passing that David Stark has recently rediscovered the usefulness of the concept of heterarchy for the description and explanation of social organization bootstrapping itself by embedding within the network it needs as its own precondition.

The single tool most apt for the combination of network and self-reference is George Spencer-Brown's concept of the form of distinction, advanced in his 1969 book on the *Laws of Form*. Based on the idea of the distinction as an operation to be actually undertaken Spencer-Brown defines the "form" of the distinction as "the space cloven by any distinction, together with the entire content of the space" . This means that there are at least three values defining any one distinction, which are (1) the marked state, indicated by the distinction (the "inside" of the distinction), (2) the unmarked state, the state not indicated by the distinction (the "outside" of the distinction), and (3) the distinction itself, separating the two states or sides of the distinction by being drawn. Since the distinction is an operation actually being drawn it may be taken to be identical to the observer drawing it.

We take this form of the distinction to single out the minimal constellation of a network able to synthesize, in that it defines reference, as indication, self-reference, as the distinction being drawn by an observer, and a general network value, as the unmarked state being indeterminate, yet to be determined by further choice, i.e., distinction. The one idea introduced by Spencer-Brown, which is sociologically perhaps the most intriguing one, is the possibility to take unmarked states, or empty places, though being indeterminate or unknown, into account nevertheless.

Georg Simmel, in his digression on the question of how society is possible, already has a keen eye on that necessity of empty, yet to be determined places, for the synthesis of the society, in that he describes modern society as providing a place (*eine Stelle*) for the unpredictable individual, and as defining a kind of being socialized which is determined, or at least partially determined, as he says, by a kind of not being socialized. That is of course just another formulation of the century-old discovery that individuals in their thinking, wishing, and feeling are opaque to outside observers (and to themselves, indeed), thus forcing society, on the one hand, to account for the unpredictable by means of communication that are sufficiently attractive for individuals to participate in, and to provide for structures, on the other hand, which are able to socialize the individual into such a kind of being unpredictable, thus telling it how to deal with its necessity to be free, as Hegel used to say.

Network synthesis comes with reference, self-reference, and the form of any distinction including an unmarked state as a way to account for network. To synthesize a network means to indicate, to self-include, and to account for the indeterminate. We take it that accounting for the indeterminate is only possible within the distinction of reference and self-reference, thus ending up with a self-similar structure which repeats itself by having to take into account ever new unmarked states.

Let me come back to our attempt to do a little bit of the sociological theory which might be helpful in watching what happens to modern society when first the computer, then the internet, and now web 2.0 are introduced to it. The idea is to describe a change from modern society, based on the dissemination medium of the printing press, to the next society, based on the computer, the net, and the grid. We call what is emerging "the next society" to honour Peter F. Drucker who gave it not only that name but also looked in the consequences of it for management and organization (see his book "Managing in the Next Society", New York 2003). "Next" is a perfect name, since it spells out what the next society is about: to always be able to find a next step while watching, from the corners of your eyes, what is happening next to it. That is why we think that George Spencer-Brown's notion of form is perfectly suitable to give that way of operation, iteration, and reproduction its core notion.

We start with some ideas about network synthesis.

Sociological theory has always been a theory of the network synthesis of social action. In the computer age of the society this has to become explicit. To know about the form of the network synthesis of social action means to know how our society, the next one, the knowledge society deals with its dynamics by generating specific structures able to sustain social action.

I will here present two attempts to take a closer look at the network synthesis of social action. It first will go back to Niklas Luhmann's conjecture about the structures of the society depending mainly on culture forms able to deal with the surplus meaning, or overflow, produced by the introduction of new media of the dissemination of communication. This is a conjecture about the structures of the society being the outcome of the society having to find a solution to new kinds of overflows by switching from one culture form, and the structure, order, and understanding of the society coming with it, to another one. The morphogenesis of the society depends on these dissemination media eclipsing one another, all of them staying present, however, even if changed in scope, scale, and range.

I will then try to develop a model of social action which takes into account the culture form possibly able to deal with the surplus meaning brought about by the introduction of the computer as a medium of the dissemination of communication. This model is a form model, integrating ideas from sociological systems theory and sociological network theory. It tries to be simple enough to be able to catch the complexity of social action.

We begin with presenting some general ideas on a sociological theory of social action. And we conclude with a proposal to go from objects and subjects of social action to what we will call the catjects of social action. This actually is a proposal to look at categories which are able to describe and explain what kind of underlying reality is produced and reproduced by the *eigen*-values of social action. These catjects combine reference with self-reference, and with some way to account for the unknowable, in unfolding, exploring, and synthesizing a network of variables whose values social action brings about, calls on, and subverts.