Talking to Tom Fuerstner and looking at his blogjects an idea strikes me. What if we extend our century-old talking about objects and subjects to a talking about catjects? Looking at computers' and networks' abilities to handle multimedia quasi-objects (Michel Serres) and boundary objects (Susan Star), and not only to handle them but to indexicalize, catalogize, link and search them, we certainly deal with a new kind of -jects which take on a life almost all of its own. Remember Jacques Derrida's theory "jetties"? They are similar, being missiles send on their way and related to by observers of most different perspective.

Objects, for Aristotle, are the hypokemeinon, the underlying stuff and substance of the writing society. Aristotle, in his first book on logic, the Categories, tries to fix them such decisions can be taken whether assertions about them are true or false. Reading his text it is fascinating to observe how he has to rely, first, on forms, then, on genres, in order to fix at least our talking about them, since the objects themselves are elusive. They emerge, and vanish the moment you look at them. Ever since, we argue about the reality of our perceptions.

Subjects, for Hume, Descartes, and Kant, are the hypokemeinon, the underlying stuff and substance of the printing press society. Human reason, individual doubts, judgements become the address to which categories get attributed such that we know what and how we are able to talk about. However, these subjects are as elusive as the objects before. They have to be transcendentalized in order to fix them, framing them with respect to sensus communis, to acceptable ways of talk, in order to get them pinned down where logics need them. In fact, subjects are individuals having their own minds and hearts and bodies and memories and fears and desires. They don't accept being looked at as being in charge of reason. Let reason take charge of itself, Kant therefore had to muse. That cuts a long story short. Ever since, we argue about the truth an observer may claim.

Catjects are an idea which might be appropriate for computer society. That idea, crude as it is as yet, takes seriously that the categories that were attributed first to objects and then to subjects and didn't stick, at least underwent their own development and refinement. From Peirce to Whitehead and more recently on to Joseph A. Goguen, Bill Lawvere, and Ernst Kleinert, categories enter the center stage of mathematical and philosophical thinking. We might try to look at how they start to lead their own life, becoming catjects, based not on substance nor on reason, but on their own form, their own morphism, emerging as an eigen-value of nonlinear recursive processes in syntactical, semantic, and pragmatic computations, in pictures, sounds, texts, and gestures, a kind of sociological topology (or topological sociology) for which ideas of all kinds abound. Ever since, we love to argue about the functions of our arguments.

That is an idea spelled out at its most crude. The literature is rich, yet complicated. Maybe, we look a little closer at the authors quoted for ideas how to do what System One attempts to do, flashing out semantic webs for almost about everything.